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Rationalising Restitutionary Damages
in Contract Law --
An Elusive or Illusory Quest?*
Andrew Phang^ and Pey-Woan Lee+
The present article surveys various issues in the law relating to the award of restitutionary damages in contract law,
utilising as its point of focus the recent House of Lords decision in Attorney-General v Blake. It explores, in particular,
two possible (albeit quite different) routes towards the recovery of such damages: the first based on the (more
traditional) compensatory basis and the second on the (more controversial) restitutionary basis for disgorgement of the
defendant's gain. While we argue that there is, on a more general level, no overriding objection in principle to the
award of restitutionary damages for cynical breach of contract, this is still a rather controversial area. Looked at in
this light, we suggest that the judicious award of restitutionary damages in situations where public policy requires it
(such as, we argue, was the case in Blake itself) may be the preferable (albeit more modest) way forward.
Introduction
The topic of restitutionary damages in the situation of contractual breach has been described by a leading commentator
as `a devilishly difficult topic'.1 Even this is, as we shall see, an understatement. We utilise, as our point of focus, the
recent House of Lords decision in Attorney-General v Blake.2 It will soon become apparent, however, that that decision
raises far more issues than it resolves. However, an even close to satisfactory resolution of these various issues
constitutes a series of tasks for the future.
One of the principal tasks of the present piece is, as its title suggests, to ascertain whether the task of rationalising the
various difficulties surrounding the topic of restitutionary damages in contract law is either an elusive quest or (worse
still) an illusory one. It is clear, in our view at least, that it is at a minimum an elusive task, given the virtual
intractability of some of the issues, for instance, that centring around the development of objective criteria.
In order to avoid any unnecessary confusion in terminology, we should emphasise what is in fact reiterated in all the
literature on restitution law: that there is a distinction between damages that are awarded to reverse a wrongful transfer
from the plaintiff to the defendant and damages that are awarded in order to disgorge the gain that accrues to the
defendant, even though the plaintiff might not have suffered any financial loss. On a very general level, the term
`restitutionary damages' could conceivably apply to both heads of loss. However, for the purposes of the present essay,
the term `restitutionary damages' refers to the latter (viz, damages in the context of disgorgement).3
The Facts and Holding in Attorney-General v Blake
A former servant of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), George Blake acted as an agent for the Soviet Union between
1951 and 1960, disclosing secret information and documents. Upon his arrest and trial, he pleaded guilty to five charges
under the Official Secrets Act 1911 and was sentenced to 42 years of imprisonment. He escaped from prison in 1966
and sought refuge in Moscow, where he had remained since.
In 1989, apparently unapologetic for his misdeeds, Blake entered into a contract with Jonathan Cape Ltd for the
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publication of his autobiography titled No Other Choice. The autobiography was published in 1990 and included
accounts of his spying activities, arrest and trial, as well as his subsequent escape from prison. It was accepted that none
of the information disclosed in the book was of a secret or confidential nature at the time of the publication. Under the
terms of the publishing contract, the publishers agreed to pay Blake royalties amounting to £150,000, an order of
payment clearly induced by his notoriety. For obvious reasons, Blake did not at any time seek the Crown's consent for
the publication. The government learnt of the intended publication from a press announcement but did not then take any
action to restrain the act. However, upon discovering the immoderate profit Blake would make from the publication, the
Attorney-General commenced proceedings to restrain Jonathan Cape Ltd from making any further payments, by which
time Blake had already received £60,000 and the balance of £90,000 remained payable.
Before Sir Richard Scott V-C,4 the Attorney-General claimed that the Crown was the rightful owner of the copyright of
Blake's book and was entitled to an account of profit of all sums due from the publishers to Blake on the basis that
Blake had breached the fiduciary duty owed to the Crown not to profit from his position as a former member of the SIS
nor benefit himself through the use of the Crown's property (including confidential information). Sir Richard Scott V-C
rejected these claims. A duty of this breadth would unreasonably restrain freedom to trade and interfere with the right of
free expression. On appeal, this conclusion was upheld by the Court of Appeal5 notwithstanding the consideration
(apparently for the first time on appeal) of an undertaking signed by Blake at the time of entering the Crown's
employment not to divulge any official information gained in the course of his employment during, as well as after, his
period of service. Blake's contractual obligations did not constitute fiduciary obligations.
In the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General mounted a fresh claim in public law in addition to his private law claim in
equity. The appellate court agreed with the Attorney-General that as the guardian of public interest, the
Attorney-General may, exceptionally, institute civil proceedings in aid of the criminal law, to ensure that a criminal did
not profit directly from the commission of his crime. This was so notwithstanding the fact that Blake had not been, and
was unlikely ever to be, convicted of any offence in connection with the publication of his book. On this basis, the
Court of Appeal granted an injunction in the nature of a `freezing order' to restrain the publishers from paying Blake the
remaining royalty without extinguishing his title thereto. However, for contract and restitution lawyers alike, the more
significant and fascinating part of Lord Woolf's judgment in the Court of Appeal lies not in the rationale of his decision
but his obiter comments on the availability of restitutionary (in place of compensatory) damages for breach of contract.
6 Undeterred by the Attorney-General's decision not to pursue the claim, Lord Woolf identified two exceptional
situations where it would be just to award restitutionary damages as compensatory damages would be inadequate in
protecting the plaintiff's legitimate interest in having the contract performed. The first comprises cases of `skimped'
performance, where the defendant `fails to provide the full extent of the services he has contracted to provide and for
which he has charged the plaintiff';7 the second involves situations where the defendant `has obtained his profit by
doing the very thing which he contracted not to do'.8 In both situations, the defendant makes a profit or a saving in
expense but there is no corresponding measurable financial loss in the expectation of the plaintiff. In his Lordship's
view, the facts of Blake would fall squarely within the second situation and entitle the Crown to claim the profits due to
Blake as damages for breach of contract.
In an unexpected turn of events, Blake (who had not taken part in the preceding proceedings) appealed against the
decision of the Court of Appeal through the assistance of counsel and solicitors acting pro bono. At the same time, the
Crown cross-appealed to claim the profits due to Blake as restitutionary damages arising from the breach of his
contractual undertaking. Their Lordships unanimously rejected the Court of Appeal's stance on the public law issue; the
injunctive order granted by the Court of Appeal was in substance confiscatory and ran foul of the constitutional
principle that the common law conferred no power to confiscate property without compensation.
However, a majority of the Law Lords (Lord Hobhouse dissenting) took the view that the just response to the breach by
Blake of a contractual undertaking to the Crown not to disclose official information would be to award the Crown
damages measured by the profits due from the publishers to Blake.9 In the leading judgment, Lord Nicholls affirmed the
orthodox rule that damages for breach of contract are generally compensatory but concluded, after reviewing a series of
authorities in tort and equity,10 that there was `no reason, in principle, why the court must in all circumstances rule out
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an account of profits as a remedy for breach of contract ... When, exceptionally, a just response to a breach of contract
so requires, the court should be able to grant the discretionary remedy of requiring a defendant to account to the plaintiff
for the benefits he has received from his breach of contract. In the same way as a plaintiff's interest in performance of a
contract may render it just and equitable for the court to make an order for specific performance or grant an injunction,
so the plaintiff's interest in performance may make it just and equitable that the defendant should retain no benefit from
his breach of contract'.11 The majority also declined to adopt the two categories identified by Lord Woolf in the Court
of Appeal as appropriate restitutionary responses, preferring instead to lay down a general test (which was by no means
exhaustive), namely, `whether the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in preventing the defendant's profit-making activity
and, hence, in depriving him of his profit'.12
In contrast, Lord Hobhouse in his dissent adopted the robust stance that in allowing the cross-appeal, the majority was
guilty of the familiar judicial vice of creating bad law in order to reach an intuitively just decision.13 In his Lordship's
view, the only true motivation for stripping Blake of his profits was that `Blake should be punished and deprived of any
fruits of conduct connected with his former criminal and reprehensible conduct'.14 To that end, the application of legal
principles intended to protect commercial or proprietary interests did not appear appropriate. Further, his Lordship
doubted whether there was truly a gap in the existing state of law that warranted the extension of a non-compensatory
remedy such as the present. The Crown had the opportunity to seek an injunction to prevent the publication of the book
but did not do so at the appropriate time. The Crown's predicament was not due to any gap in the law but its failure to
employ a remedy when it was available and which, if granted, would have had the effect of fully protecting its
performance interest.15 Lord Hobhouse considered that restitutionary damages had traditionally been available for
restoring to an aggrieved party property interests which he or she had been deprived of and the essence of such remedy
was to ensure the performance of the defaulter's obligations.16 This measure of damages was therefore inappropriate on
the facts of the present case where Blake had no obligation left to perform and no property interests had been detracted
from the Crown which warranted restoration. 17
Attorney-General v Blake -- The Absence of Normative Guidance
Blake no doubt presented the House with a Herculean task. While intuitive justice militates against permitting an
absconded criminal and traitor to retain and enjoy the fruits of his misdeeds, there is, nonetheless, virtually no authority
(as the majority admitted18) in the law of contract which allows the award of damages of the nature sought by the
Crown. In contrast, cases asserting the compensatory measure as the general (or only) measure for contractual damages
abound. For the House of Lords, however, this was not an insurmountable difficulty. As Lord Nicholls (with whom the
other Law Lords in the majority agreed) attempted to show, the award of restitutionary damages to a plaintiff who has
not suffered a corresponding financial loss was no stranger to the law. Such awards had long been available for
proprietary torts such as trespass to land19 and wrongful detention of goods.20 The remedy of account of profits was
also available for infringement of intellectual property rights, such as passing off and infringement of trade marks,
copyrights and patents.21 Where fiduciaries and trustees are concerned, equity has consistently been committed to
stripping them of any gain earned in breach of their respective duties. The relevant cases demonstrate that `the court will
award substantial damages for an infringement when no financial loss flows from the infringement and, moreover, will
assess the damages by reference to the defendant's profit obtained from the infringement'.22 That being the case, what
distinguishes contractual breaches from other non-contractual breaches such as to warrant a blanket denial of
restitutionary remedies? Nothing, in the view of the majority Law Lords. In fact, to insist otherwise could render the law
capricious, as was poignantly illustrated by Lord Nicholls:23
If confidential information is wrongfully divulged in breach of a non-disclosure agreement, it would be nothing short of sophistry
to say that an account of profits may be ordered in respect of the equitable wrong but not in respect of the breach of contract which
governs the relationship between the parties.
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This proposition has been rigorously canvassed and finds strong support in the academic literature. Professor Birks, for
example, has in fact convincingly demonstrated the inconsistencies and anomalies that would arise where restitutionary
damages are not awarded for cynical breach of contract and yet (as is currently the case) awarded in other
(non-contractual) areas of the law.24 Nonetheless, it was plain that Lord Nicholls was not merely stating that
restitutionary damages should be awarded for breach of contract where there was a concurrent claim under a separate
cause of action giving rise to such a remedy. Such a proposition would not have assisted the Crown in Blake. His
Lordship's proposition goes further -- that since restitutionary damages are an appropriate response to other civil
breaches in certain circumstances, they should equally be so for breach of contract. The question to be answered by the
House of Lords, then, is `not whether restitutionary damages should ever be available for breach of contract, but in what
circumstances should they be made available'.25
A careful reading of the majority's judgments suggests that such `circumstances' involve the satisfaction of at least two
criteria: first, where an award of damages assessed by reference to the plaintiff's loss would not be adequate because the
loss suffered by the plaintiff is not readily measurable in terms of money;26 and second, where the plaintiff has a
`legitimate interest' in preventing the defendant's profit-making activity.27
Turning to the first criterion, Lord Nicholls considered that the grant of specific performance for breach of a contract for
the sale of land epitomised the principle that the law is willing to look beyond the usual measure of damages to ensure
that a plaintiff's performance interest is fully respected. The same principle underlies the award of specific and
injunctive reliefs in other cases. In his Lordship's view, Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd28 is good
authority for the award of damages by reference to the defendant's gain when the plaintiff's loss (measured by the
diminution in market value of the property) resulting from the breach of contractual covenant was nominal.29 Mindful
of the frequent attempts to confine the application of the decision in Wrotham Park to cases involving the infringement
of property rights,30 Lord Nicholls expressly doubted the validity of the dichotomy between property and contractual
rights. Indeed, it has been argued that contract rights are themselves (admittedly, on a broad interpretation) a species of
property rights, which can therefore give rise to a remedy in restitutionary damages where the defendant would not have
derived the benefit concerned but for his or her breach of contract.31 While this particular approach is not without
difficulties, we are of the view that there is much to be said in favour of Lord Nicholls's rejection of a strict dichotomy
between property and contractual rights. Although one commentator has argued that personal rights (including contract
rights) are not the same as property rights,32 another commentator has adopted a different view: the latter writer argues
(persuasively, in our view)33 that although the concept of `property' has both wide as well as narrow senses (embodied
in the terms `proprietary rights' and `personal rights', respectively), these different senses only represent a distinction in
the range of persons against whom the respective rights can be invoked34 and do not in any way justify the greater
protection of the one (proprietary rights) over the other (personal rights, that include contractual rights).35
In our view, there appear to be at least two difficulties with the concept of remedial inadequacy identified as the first
qualifying criterion for restitutionary awards. First of all, the judgments of the majority do not overtly identify the
nature of the inadequacy (in the remedial response) in question. The very facts of Blake itself provide no useful
guidance on the nature of such `remedial inadequacy'. As Lord Hobhouse observed in his dissent, the Crown did have a
good and substantial remedy for the enforcement of Blake's undertaking in the form of an injunctive relief.36 Having
made a deliberate choice to give up a substantial remedy, it could hardly complain subsequently that there was a
remedial lacuna which ought to be filled. In Lord Hobhouse's view (albeit relating to the narrower respect of negative
undertakings involving proprietary rights): 37
Where the plaintiff has failed to obtain or failed to apply for an injunction, he has to be content with damages. What has happened
in such cases is that there has either actually or in effect been a compulsory purchase of the plaintiff's right of refusal ... What the
plaintiff has lost is the sum which he could have exacted from the defendant as the price of his consent to the development. This is
an example of compensatory damages. They are damages for breach. They do not involve any concept of restitution and so to
describe them is an error.
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The force of the above argument cannot be denied. Ironically, some tacit support for this view can also be found in Lord
Nicholls's leading judgment where his Lordship reiterated that restitutionary damages for breach of contract must be
confined to very exceptional cases, because `[n]ormally the remedies of damages, specific performance and injunction,
coupled with the characterization of some contractual obligations as fiduciary, will provide an adequate response to a
breach of contract. It will only be in exceptional cases, where these remedies are inadequate, that any question of
accounting for profits will arise'.38 The implication arising therefrom is that no remedial inadequacy could arise unless
a plaintiff has exhausted this range of remedies, though admittedly this would not be consistent with the result in Blake.
This rather hazy concept of `remedial inadequacy' leads us to a second and more fundamental difficulty: that the
adoption of the remedial inadequacy of the compensatory measure as the qualifying premise for the award of the
restitutionary remedy shrouds the true rationale for the award in Blake. On the one hand, the emphasis on the
inadequacy of the compensatory measure appears to reaffirm the law's commitment to protect a contracting party's
expectation interest. The award of specific reliefs is a clear instance of this commitment. Both the reasoning and result
in Wrotham Park, relied on by Lord Nicholls as the `solitary beacon',39 the authority which shows that contractual
damages may be assessed by reference to the defendant's gains, are (in our view) consistent with the application of
compensatory principles40 which would, ex hypothesi, resolve the issue at hand without the need for recourse to the
rubric of restitutionary damages.41 On the other hand, the restitutionary nature of the award and the virtual absence of
any attempt to explain why Blake's gains were an appropriate measure of the Crown's loss42 may suggest that the desire
to strip the defaulter of his gains (as opposed to the desire to compensate the plaintiff for his loss) was the true
motivation for the decision. The majority proceeded on the premise that the award to the Crown would be all or none of
Blake's profits and at no point in time pondered the need to quantify the Crown's loss, as would have been necessary
under a compensatory approach. Yet, there was no suggestion that the award of five per cent of the defendants' profits in
Wrotham Park was erroneous.43 If the majority had intended that the restitutionary award be a means of redressing the
remedial inadequacy of the compensatory approach, then in so doing it has, with respect, failed to satisfactorily address
a conceptual difficulty raised by some commentators:44 which is that restitutionary damages may neither be a sufficient
nor an appropriate remedy if the true impetus of the award is the plaintiff's loss; and that since the concern lies in the
proper recompense of loss, the enquiry on the appropriate measure of such loss should focus on the loss rather than the
gain. Given the extent of the difficulties discussed above, it may appear that the majority's judgments in Blake have
fallen short of proffering a principle which is precise both in concept and application. Nonetheless, the present writers
are of the view that these difficulties may be overcome and rationalized.45
Turning to the second criterion, while the inadequacy of compensatory damages is a necessary condition for the award
of restitutionary damages,46 it is certainly not, by itself, a sufficient condition. In addition to establishing the inadequacy
of the usual measure of damages, the plaintiff will also have to show that he has a legitimate interest in preventing the
defendant's profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving him of his profit. In determining whether such interest exists,
`[the] court will have regard to all the circumstances, including the subject matter of the contract, the purpose of the
contractual obligation which has been breached, the circumstances in which the breach occurred, the consequences of
the breach and the circumstances in which the relief is being sought'.47
It is apparent that the House of Lords has deliberately crafted the second criterion of `legitimate interest' as a broad and
fluid conception in acknowledgement of its inevitable lack of prescience and of its unwillingness to lay down specifics
which may either on one extreme unduly constrain its application or on the other accord this somewhat extraordinary48
remedy a more prominent role than it rightly deserves. A criterion of this nature, however, inevitably renders the task of
distilling useful and practical guidance therefrom formidable at best and futile at worst. Starting with the limited
guidance given by the House,49 it would appear that this criterion endows the Court with a considerably broad
discretion in determining the availability of such restitutionary awards, and may on that account appear instinctively
objectionable in the absence of any normative guidance on how such discretion should be exercised. However, the
Courts have not hitherto been unfamiliar with the exercise of such broad discretions, the grant of equitable reliefs being
a notable example. In Blake, such legitimate interest was identified as follows:50
The Crown had and has a legitimate interest in preventing Blake profiting from the disclosure of official information, whether
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classified or not, while a member of the service or thereafter. Neither he, nor any member of the service, should have a financial
incentive to break his undertaking. It is of paramount importance that members of the services should have complete confidence in
all their dealings with each other, and that those recruited as informers should have the like confidence. Undermining the
willingness of prospective informers to co-operate with the services, or undermining the morale or trust between members of the
services when engaged on secret and dangerous operations, would jeopardize the effectiveness of the service. An absolute rule
against disclosure, visible to all, makes good sense.
That the `interest' so identified is the deterrence51 of morally reprehensible conduct which would threaten the efficacy
of the Secret Intelligence Service, and by extension, a nation's security, should be noted. Such interest is `over and
above the hope of a benefit to be assessed in monetary terms'.52 The analogy drawn by Lord Steyn from the strict rules
applicable to trustees and fiduciaries underscores this same concern.53 His Lordship observed that Blake, being under a
contractual undertaking not to divulge any information entrusted to him in the course of his employment with the
Crown, had a relationship that was `closely analogous to that of fiduciaries'. However, it is respectfully submitted that
this analogy tends to obscure rather than illuminate. The High Court had unequivocally decided that Blake did not owe
any fiduciary duty to the Crown at the time of publication of his book because, inter alia, the information disclosed had
lost its confidential quality. This finding was accepted by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. It is
inconceivable that by this new label Lord Steyn intended that every person who has been entrusted with confidential
information would continue to be bound under some phantom liability towards the informer even after the information
has long ceased to be confidential. While it is laudable that the majority of the House did adopt a refreshing approach
insofar as it did not distort and stretch the concept of a `fiduciary' beyond any reasonable conception thereof, as is wont
to be the case on occasion at least,54 anyone hoping to distill valuable guidance from the analogy is nonetheless left
with a sense of exasperation.
It is highly probable that the `legitimate interest' so identified by the majority Law Lords in Blake is essentially a mask
for punishing Blake for his egregious conduct, a view to which Lord Hobhouse subscribed.55 If this is correct, it follows
that the decision in Blake is inconsistent with the entrenched principle that contract damages are not punitive, and it
follows, further, that the decision is prima facie inconsistent with the majority's affirmation of the Court of Appeal's
stance that a cynical and deliberate breach of contract did not give rise to such `legitimate interest'. However, we very
much doubt if this latter view of the majority was intended to exclude the moral calibre of the defendant's breach as a
(significant) factor in determining whether the plaintiff did in fact have the requisite legitimate interest.56 Indeed, there
are constant references in the judgments in the House to the need to achieve a just result.57 The key issue here, however,
is whether or not the attainment of such a result is consistent with coherent legal reasoning and analysis.58
Be that as it may, accepting that the Crown established a legitimate interest on the particular facts of Blake where the
misdemeanor involved was almost certainly (if prosecuted) a criminal offence and if left uncensured might have
resulted in the compromise of national security, it is tempting to conclude that the Crown's `legitimate interest' in Blake
arose from its very unusual facts and therefore is likely to be of very limited value as a precedent. So we are told that
such legitimate interest must be something over and above the hope of a monetary benefit, but are hardly given any clue
to identify it, except perhaps to the extent (as we have mentioned59) that the mere fact that a plaintiff would be
under-compensated under the usual measure is not sufficient. Does it not appear then, that in the final analysis, the
majority in Blake have not furnished us with any substantive normative guidance?60
In our view, however, the contrary is more compelling. Notwithstanding the uncertainties that have surfaced from the
judgments of the majority of the House, the decision in Blake, rightly understood in the light of relevant authorities and
principles, can and should be seen as an authority that lays down principles which are not as broad and vague as may
appear at first sight. Whilst the majority may have refused to accord the right to specific categories such as skimped
performances, breach of negative covenants61 or cynical breaches, this should not be seen as a deliberate move to close
the door to gain-based awards in these instances. As we shall attempt to show, the decision in Blake is both consistent
with established contract principles and provides a valuable illustration of how, where justified by considerations of
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public policy, restitutionary principles apply to justify disgorgement in the context of contractual breaches. The latter is,
admittedly, a narrower and more specific interpretation of the majority decision in Blake but is nevertheless supportable
in both logic as well as principle.62 As we argue below, however, there is no reason in principle why an extension of
restitutionary recovery should not encompass broader situations (such as cynical breaches of contract), though we do
acknowledge and canvass the various difficulties involved (in particular, the problem of subjectivity or relativity of
values). Given these difficulties that have no immediate satisfactory solutions, we suggest that a narrower approach
(premised on the rubric of public policy) may well be not only the best interpretation of Blake but also the best way
forward at the present time. However, if (as already alluded to above), the damages awarded can be rationalised on a
compensatory basis instead, we could in fact avoid these various difficulties altogether. It is to this possible alternative
that our attention briefly turns in the following Part.
Restitutionary Loss as Expectation Loss?
At a threshold level, we would suggest that we could avoid the dilemmas posed by the concept of restitutionary
damages by simply construing (or re-construing) many of the relevant cases, including Blake itself, as instances where
damages were compensatory in nature,63 thus avoiding the difficulties of justifying the bases upon which restitutionary
damages for wrongs (where the plaintiff has, ex hypothesi, suffered no financial loss) may be awarded. We shall argue,
in particular, that what appears to be restitutionary damages are in fact compensatory damages which utilise (for want of
a tangible alternative) the defendant's gain as (and only as) a measure to quantify compensatory damages. In this regard,
compensatory damages would be awarded on the following basis:64
The defendant's wrongful conduct has deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to bargain with the defendant, and to set his own
price on his consent. The legal position can be explained by saying that the defendant should be prevented from circumventing the
bargaining process, and where prevention fails, damages should be awarded to compensate the plaintiff for this lost opportunity.
This is of course not a novel argument by any means. Its principal weakness, centring on artificiality, has in fact been
succinctly pointed out in characteristically perceptive fashion by Professor Birks.65 However, as has been pointed out,
this argument has to be weighed against the not inconsiderable objective of achieving fairness in the case at hand.66 As
importantly, such an approach is, we suggest, not always (and, certainly, not necessarily) characterised by artificiality.
It should be noted, in this regard, that Professor Stoljar has argued, inter alia, that the crux of the cause of action is in
contract and that restitution operates, if at all, within the context of contract; if, in other words, the plaintiff can truly be
shown to have suffered no loss whatsoever, then such restitution cannot take effect since there is `no actionability
without loss': `[t]he upshot is that what is now called restitution rather becomes, as indeed it only can be, a remedy for
loss'.67 The learned author persuasively argues that the loss is, in effect, compensatory, but is determined by reference
to the defendant's gain;68 such gain (in other words) is, in most instances at least, merely a way of calculating the
plaintiff's loss.69 We shall return to this important point shortly.
The nature of the present essay in fact precludes a detailed consideration of this issue of characterisation but it will
suffice for our present purposes to consider briefly three major precedents (including Blake) in order to ascertain the
viability (or otherwise) of the basic argument from characterisation canvassed in the preceding paragraphs from the very
practical perspective of application. It should be added that from the specific sphere of application, the refinement and
clarification of general principle often emerges, as is hoped will be the case here.
In the first case, that of Brightman J in Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd,70 the plaintiffs brought an
action for the defendants' breach of covenant that stipulated that development of the land concerned was to be in strict
accordance with plans that had to be approved by, inter alia, the plaintiff vendor itself. The defendants, however,
commenced building in breach of the said covenant, and the plaintiffs brought an action for both an injunction to
restrain building on the land as well as a mandatory injunction to demolish any buildings hitherto built in breach of the
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covenant. Brightman J refused the grant of a mandatory injunction (and understandably so, because the grant of such an
injunction is always a drastic step and potentially productive of unreasonable waste, as was the case here); he awarded,
instead, such damages as might reasonably have been demanded by the plaintiffs in return for its (the plaintiff) relaxing
the covenant and allowing the defendants to build. In the event, the learned judge awarded the plaintiffs five per cent of
the reasonably anticipated profits of the defendant. The key question for our purposes is the precise nature of the
damages awarded by the court. Were these damages compensatory in nature or were they in fact restitutionary,
disgorging part (albeit a small part) of the gains made by the defendant? A close perusal of the relevant part of the
judgment does not really assist: at least in a conclusive fashion. There is a clear focus by the learned judge on fairness.71
This might suggest a restitutionary measure but is, it is submitted, equally consistent with a compensatory one. There
would be a persuasive argument in favour of the former, provided that there was no opportunity of awarding the latter.
But the issue of the possibility of the award of compensatory damages is precisely what is to be determined here, so that
any reliance on the argument just mentioned would be circular and question-begging. Brightman J did, however,
expressly refer to the issue of ascertaining compensatory loss: in his words, `to measure damages by reference to that
sum which would place the plaintiffs in the same position as if the covenant had not been broken'.72 The learned judge
then proceeded immediately to consider two options that would have avoided the breaking of the covenant in the first
instance: first, for the defendant not to have developed the site concerned (which was of course not the case) and,
second, for the defendant `to have sought from the plaintiffs a relaxation of the covenant'.73 Adopting this second
approach, Brightman J nevertheless acknowledged that:74
[o]n the facts of this particular case the plaintiffs, rightly conscious of their obligations towards existing residents, would clearly not
have granted any relaxation, but for present purposes I must assume that it could have been induced to do so. In my judgment a just
substitute for a mandatory injunction would be such a sum of money as might reasonably have been demanded by the plaintiffs
from [the defendants] as a quid pro quo for relaxing the covenant.
We would submit that, viewing his reasoning as a whole, Brightman J clearly had in mind the compensatory measure in
the Wrotham Park case, although it is true that it is possible to interpret the process as well as result as being consistent
with the award of damages on a restitutionary basis -- a point that is also made by Mrs Janet O'Sullivan in her
perceptive paper.75 Our submission is based on a close (and, we would add, contextual) construction of the language
utilised by the learned judge: in particular, the quotation just set out above. One major objection to such an
interpretation is that the bargaining or negotiating process attributed to the contracting parties is (to return to a critique
referred to earlier) artificial and fictional.76 Indeed, Brightman J appears to have admitted as much in the quotation
above. It is submitted, however, that this is not a crucial objection at all: the plaintiffs had clearly suffered a loss as a
result of a breach of contract and should rightly have been compensated for that loss. The apparent artificiality that
emerges from the above quotation merely goes to the method of compensation, with nothing turning on substantive
principle or liability as such. If there is a further objection to the effect that artificiality remains, we would suggest that
this, too, is of little consequence. Indeed, there are many cases where calculating the quantum of damages to be
awarded is awkward, to say the least. However, the courts have consistently declared that they would simply do their
best to quantify damages77 and this case is simply an illustration of both the difficulties that at least occasionally crop
up as well as the manner in which the court deals with these difficulties. This interpretation is buttressed, we suggest, by
the learned judge's declaration that the damages awarded in the instant case were `a just substitute' for a mandatory
injunction; this clearly connotes a compensatory (as opposed to a restitutionary) measure of damages. Indeed,
Brightman J's emphasis on reasonableness in the final decision of the quantum of damages to be awarded is reminiscent
(to pick a relatively recent decision of moment) of that of the House of Lords in Ruxley Electronics and Constructions
Ltd v Forsyth,78 where (in the context of an attempt to recover the `cost of cure' instead of the `difference in value' with
respect to expectation loss) the court clearly adopted an objective approach as to what it felt was (in this case)
unreasonable under the circumstances.79
One final issue remains: the Wrotham Park case has been often perceived as one that involved a proprietary wrong,80
and has been rationalised accordingly on that basis. It is, of course, true that in that case contract and property overlap.
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However, as we have already briefly pointed out above,81 any distinction that leads to different results is both artificial
and does no credit to the law as a logical as well as substantive system.
The second case is that of the Court of Appeal in Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd.82 In that case, the
plaintiffs had sold their registered land to the defendant developer, with the contract concerned containing covenants,
including one by the defendant that it would develop the land in accordance with the original planning permission
which it had obtained. The planning permission allowed the construction of 72 dwelling units but the defendant then
managed to obtain subsequent planning permission to build 77 units instead: which it did. The defendant had thus acted
in breach of the covenants and the plaintiffs sought damages. Interestingly, it never sought an interim injunction to
restrain the defendant from developing the land otherwise than in accordance with the original planning permission. It
was claiming, instead, as damages, the profit made by the defendant by breaking the covenants and building 77 (instead
of 72) dwelling units, or at least a reasonable proportion thereof. The court held in favour of the defendant. If, however,
the central argument endorsed in this Part of the essay is correct, then if it can be shown that the plaintiffs could have
obtained something in the form of a monetary recompense as part of the bargaining process in negotiations for the
plaintiffs' permission to relax the said covenant, the decision of the court should have gone the other way. There is in
fact some indication from the case itself that this was precisely the reason why the plaintiffs had imposed the covenants
in the first place; in the words of Dillon LJ:83
Indeed, the plaintiffs say, and I have no reason to doubt, that their sole purpose in imposing the covenants at all -- to commence
and pursue the development to its completion in accordance with the first planning permission -- was that the defendant would have
to apply for and pay for a relaxation if it wanted to build anything more.
However, Dillon LJ did also note that the contract itself did not provide expressly for additional payment in the event
that the defendant built more than the 72 units allowed for, which would (in his view) have settled the matter in favour
of the plaintiffs.84 In the event, he held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs could not succeed as the cause of action was
pleaded solely in contract and that the argument from loss of bargaining power was not sufficiently persuasive `because
in theory every time there is a breach of contract the injured party is deprived of his "bargaining power" to negotiate for
a financial consideration a variation of the contract which would enable the party who wants to depart from its terms to
do what he wants to do'.85 It is submitted, with respect, and consistently with the arguments proffered earlier,86 that the
argument from loss of bargaining power goes only to the quantification of expectation loss and does not constitute a
substantive cause of action in itself.87
The leading judgment was, however, delivered by Steyn LJ. The learned judge began by distinguishing amongst the
three `traditional' interests, viz, the expectation, reliance and restitutionary interests, respectively.88 He held that the
decision in the Wrotham Park case `is only defensible on the basis of the third or restitutionary principle'89 and that
`[t]he plaintiff's argument that the Wrotham Park case can be justified on the basis of a loss of bargaining opportunity is
a fiction'.90 The learned judge further held that the Wrotham Park case `is analogous to cases where the defendant has
made use of the aggrieved party's property and thereby saved expense',91 and in so doing, `readily' accepted that the
concept of `property' `must be interpreted in a wide sense'.92 However, having accepted this basis for the Wrotham Park
case, Steyn LJ was of the view that the reach of restitutionary remedies for breach of contract ought not to be extended
to cynical breach of contract, particularly because of the uncertainty that would be generated vis-à-vis commercial
transactions.93 This would, in the learned judge's view, lead to undesirable consequences, such as the discouragement of
economic activity, and an increase in insurance premiums: all of which would `not serve the public interest'.94 He
further held that there was neither a breach of fiduciary obligations nor an infringement of the plaintiffs' property
interests `even in the broadest sense of that word, nor is it closely analogous to the Wrotham Park position'.95 It might
be apposite to consider briefly these various reasons.
First, Steyn LJ's concern for the uncertainty that would otherwise result is similarly reflected in another Court of Appeal
decision that pertained to the doctrine of economic duress instead: CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher Ltd.96 One of the
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present writers has sought to argue elsewhere, with respect to Steyn LJ's approach in this lastmentioned case, that the
concern with certainty comes at a price: the attainment of fairness.97 The argument applies, it is suggested, equally here:
how is the court to achieve fairness if it seeks to eschew uncertainty? What is clear is that certainty should not be an
absolute value. It is, nevertheless, admitted that certainty is a value, particularly when (as was the approach by
Steyn LJ), this certainty is linked to the societal interest and welfare.98 But this does not meet the objection to the effect
that individual contractual rights also need to be given effect to -- not to mention the fact that the institution of contract
is itself a societal interest as well (there being, as shall be argued below, no sharp distinction between societal and
individual interests as such).99 Indeed, it should be added, in a related vein, that this emphasis on societal interests is
wholly consistent with the theory of efficient breach. As we shall see below, however, the concept of efficient breach
itself is far from persuasive.100 It should also be noted that Lord Steyn adopted quite a different approach in the context
of fraudulent misrepresentation in the House of Lords decision of Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank Ltd,101
where he observed thus:102
I make no apology for referring to moral considerations. The law and morality are inextricably interwoven. To a large extent the
law is simply formulated and declared morality. And, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law ... observed, the very notion of
deceit with its overtones is drawn from the moral world.
While it is of course possible for moral considerations to embrace societal interests (for utilitarianism, for instance, is
itself a moral conception), it is suggested that the context and tenor of the learned judge's observations as just quoted
adopt, in fact, a quite different approach.
Second, we have already proffered reasons in some detail as to why Brightman J's approach in the Wrotham Park case
ought, despite Steyn LJ's views to the contrary, to be characterised as compensatory, rather than restitutionary, in
nature.103 Indeed, given Dillon LJ's view on the nature and function of the covenants in the Bredero Homes case,104 the
situation in both the Wrotham Park and Bredero Homes cases are (contrary to Steyn LJ's views) in fact more similar
than different. This does, of course, engender serious difficulties because it would mean that the Bredero Homes case
ought to have been decided differently. In the later (also) Court of Appeal decision in Jaggard v Sawyer,105 Millett LJ
was in fact also of the view that the damages awarded in the Wrotham Park case were compensatory rather than
restitutionary, which view also supports the argument made above to the effect that the key issue in the Wrotham Park
case was really the method of calculating compensation more than anything else.106
Finally, although previous precedents clearly establish the recovery of what is, in substance, restitutionary damages in
non-contractual causes of action, we have already considered the artificiality as well as anomalies that would result if
there were a blanket prohibition on recovery in the context of breach of contract.107 It is clear, however, that Steyn LJ
did not advocate a blanket prohibition as such. Indeed, as we have seen, he was of the view that the Wrotham Park case
could be justified on restitutionary grounds. However, the difficulty, as suggested above, is that there is no material
difference in the fact situations of both the Wrotham Park and the Bredero Homes cases. But, it should be noted that
one commentator has in fact argued that in the Bredero Homes case, the plaintiffs had lost the opportunity to avail
themselves of any negotiation with the defendants as they had delayed commencing proceedings until only after the
latter had sold all the houses.108 Another has argued that `while the plaintiffs may have hoped to be paid an additional
sum if the defendant built more houses, that remained a hope rather than a guaranteed expectation. There was no
express clause requiring payment of a specified amount, or one fixed by an appropriate framework, for the building of
extra houses; and such a term could not be implied, given its uncertainty'.109 The first point is, we suggest, not really
persuasive since, if the argument centring on the calculation of a reasonable quantum of damages by the court as
proffered above is accepted, the actual fact of negotiation (or the possibility thereof) is not really crucial and this
argument would apply equally to the second point. It would of course be a different matter altogether if the plaintiffs
had waived their right to any remedy whatsoever but this was not in fact part of the substance of any of the two points
just made.
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The third case is of course that of Blake itself. The facts have already been rendered above. The issue at this juncture is
whether or not what was claimed on behalf of the Crown could be reasonably characterised as expectation loss. The
House itself thought otherwise and this is, indeed, quite persuasive at first blush. Could it not, however, be argued that
the damages awarded to the plaintiff could be characterised as compensatory damages along the lines proffered in the
instant Part? However, one commentator has argued that:110
[s]uch bargaining value did not exist at all in the case of Attorney-General v Blake. The Crown had no interest in granting
permission for Blake to disclose the information. Had Blake sought permission for publication it would not, at any price, have been
granted. The potential for injunctive relief did not have ... economic value ... The Crown, therefore, had no bargaining rights on
which to found a compensatory claim for equitable damages. In my opinion, this feature of Blake provides a sufficient ground for
departing from normal contractual principles and allowing the restitutionary claim.
However, it is significant to note that this writer did not dismiss the possibility of computing damages based on a
compensatory basis as she immediately observed that `[w]here market economics prevail, no such claim could
succeed';111 but, on the facts of Blake itself, the argument is that compensatory damages could not have been awarded.
In any event, we have already argued that the actual possibility (or otherwise) of bargaining or negotiation is not a
critical factor.
Turning from the cases, it should be noted that the general argument of this Part, that the damages awarded could be
classified as in fact compensatory rather than restitutionary is in fact supported by an excellent essay by Mrs Janet
O'Sullivan which is as yet unpublished112 but which was cited by the House of Lords not only in Blake but also in yet
another case also recently decided by the House.113 The learned writer argues that `restitutionary damages are a blunt
and unsuitable instrument for remedying defects in the compensatory measure, and cannot be justified in this role'.
Indeed, she persuasively points out, inter alia, that many unnecessary difficulties arise as a result of `an extremely
restrictive conception of loss, disregarding the plaintiff's performance interest entirely'. One simple (yet telling) example
is given as follows:114
[I]f the defendant delivers goods of inferior quality, it is no defence to an action for damages for breach of warranty that they
nonetheless `do the job' that the plaintiff intends for them, or that the plaintiff did not notice the difference until it is too late to
reject the goods. An example might be a contract for the purchase of vintage champagne, which the seller breaches by supplying
sparkling wine: no-one doubts that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, even if he or his guests consume the sparkling wine happily
without noticing the difference.
This is a powerful illustration and supports the point (made above) that what looks like restitutionary damages for
disgorgement of the defendant's gain may, in substance, be merely compensatory damages that give effect to the
plaintiff's performance interest. The entire process is, in other words, one of calculating the compensatory damages in a
situation where the plaintiff has clearly suffered loss -- a point that has been repeatedly stressed throughout this Part.
The `traditional' argument to the effect that the plaintiff has suffered no loss and is merely seeking to disgorge the
defendant's gain is clearly unpersuasive and confuses the process of calculation of compensatory loss as the award of an
entirely different type of (restitutionary) remedy altogether. It should also be noted that in Blake itself, Lord Nicholls
appeared to allow for the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, for such an approach to be adopted, as opposed to
calling for an account of profits115 (which represents restitutionary damages for disgorgement in his terminology116).
We do acknowledge, however, the countervailing argument that there may be no persuasive reason why calculation or
quantification of compensatory damages must necessarily be measured by reference to the defendant's gain.117 We
would suggest that in situations where there is really no other basis for calculating the performance interest since there
has, ex hypothesi, been no financial loss to the plaintiff, the defendant's gain represents (as argued above118) the most
practical way of quantifying the plaintiff's performance interest. It is also possible to award only a portion of the
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defendant's gain (as Brightman J did in Wrotham Park119), but the difficulty that immediately arises in this context is
that there would arise the need for the explication of a reasoned basis for the adoption of such an approach.
There is yet another possible difficulty: if the defendant's gain constitutes the basis for quantification of the plaintiff's
performance interest, should this not also be at least taken into account, even where the plaintiff's loss can be measured
by reference to the traditional principles (in, for example, a situation where it has suffered tangible financial loss,
notwithstanding the defendant's cynical breach and where the defendant is perfectly willing to pay the plaintiff damages
representing such loss in the situation of so-called `efficient breach')? As we shall argue below, however, the doctrine of
efficient breach is not without difficulties.120 Indeed, we do argue below that there is no reason why damages for
cynical breaches of contract ought not to include the award of the defendant's gain as well. The award of such damages
would, of course, be subject to the traditional rules of both remoteness and mitigation, but if a lower measure of
damages (or even no damages at all) are in fact awarded, this will be in accordance with these rules, whose operation
would (by their very nature) be dependent on the particular fact situation at hand. What is not certain, however, is the
proposition that damages based on the defendant's gain ought never to be awarded. It is of course also possible, as we
have alluded to in the preceding paragraph, to confine the award of damages premised on the defendant's gain only to
situations where it is otherwise impossible to measure the plaintiff's performance interest.
Finally, it should be observed that the approach suggested in this Part is much broader than an alternative approach that
suggests that restitutionary damages for disgorgement should only be awarded where there has been a breach of contract
that is (or was) amenable to a decree of specific performance.121 It has in fact been argued that `a restitutionary remedy
for breach of a contract amenable to a decree of specific performance will commonly resemble the compensation which
could be awarded in vindication of the dashed contractual expectations; such a remedy therefore seems less at variance
with the general aim of the law of contract, the vindication of expectations'.122 But this is, with respect, entirely
consistent with the argument proffered in this Part to the effect that recovery can be formulated in the form of
expectation or compensatory loss instead. Or, put another way, the approach suggested in this Part provides a nexus
(albeit not one that is proprietary in nature123) simply because the damages awarded are directly linked to the concept of
expectation in the first instance which is (in turn) directly linked to the breach of contract itself. It is admitted that the
argument from the availability of specific performance ensures that there is an (arguably, clearer) nexus.124 There
remains, however, the critique considered earlier in this Part to the effect that the award of damages for expectation loss
is fictitious and artificial. However, as we have already sought to demonstrate, such a critique may not constitute an
insuperable objection.
However, we should add that even if the argument in this Part is not accepted, there are nevertheless cogent reasons for
awarding damages on a restitutionary basis.125
Restitution for Wrongs and the Porcupine of Subjectivity
The decision of the House in Blake clearly concerned a situation where restitutionary damages were awarded for
wrongs, since (contrary to the argument made in the preceding Part126), the court was clearly of the view that the Crown
had suffered no financial loss and that the basic thrust of its cause of action was (if at all) to effect a disgorgement of the
defendant's gain. However, as we have seen, the precise basis of the court's decision is, with respect, not altogether
clear. In particular, it is unclear what precisely was the nature of the wrong that resulted in the award by the court. One
obvious view is that the `wrong' concerned is simply the very breach of contract itself127 -- but, again, this was not
clearly acknowledged as such by the House of Lords in Blake.
On a more general level, it is quite easy to see why courts have not taken very definitive strides forward in the area of
restitution for wrongs. The principal theoretical as well as practical difficulties centre on the porcupine of subjectivity.
Indeed, the problem of justification is one that is so basic and yet so seemingly intractable.128 It nevertheless needs to
be handled and, indeed, we have already alluded to the fact that courts everywhere and every day exercise discretion as
they strive to arrive at just and justly reasoned decisions, eschewing any charge that that exercise of discretion has fallen
prey to the ultimate sin of subjectivity or relativity.129 But it is a prickly porcupine indeed. There is no ideal way of
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handling it and, worse still, it comes in all shapes and sizes. But one thing is sure: objectivity is embedded within the
law and, indeed, within the very nature of discourse itself (whether legal or otherwise). In other words, objectivity is
inevitable, even (perhaps especially) when one is arguing for the precise opposite concept of subjectivity. Why,
otherwise, ought this argument (or any other argument, for that matter) be taken seriously in the first instance? Indeed,
the very nature of discourse and debate necessarily entails the marshalling of arguments that are at least potentially
universalisable: lest it becomes meaningless. As Professor Ronald Dworkin has put it, while we can disagree as
`internal skeptics', we cannot possibly be `external' ones.130 But even if this reasoning be accepted (as we suggest it
should), the very real difficulty remains as to how we are to ascertain whether or not a given argument is or is not
objectively true. It does no good, as Dworkin seems to argue, to rely on the idea of essentially contested concepts,131
since knowing that there is an objectively correct answer even though we all have different conceptions of what the
correct answer is is hardly a satisfactory resolution and is certainly not one that would appeal to the layperson (or even a
legally trained one, for that matter). This raises, inter alia, the seemingly intractable problem of reconciling universal
(objective) theory with particular application. More specifically, do we necessarily descend into irretrievable
subjectivity at the stage of applying principles, even if we accept the proposition that these legal principles embody
objective truth in the first instance? We cannot even begin to address such a large and basic question. One of the present
writers has attempted to argue that a classical natural law theory that is complemented by Christian theology would
provide us with a viable approach, even in the sphere of application.132 It should, in fairness, be noted that such an
argument is not without controversy,133 particularly in a world that, despite its claim to globalisation and
internationalisation, generally endorses very strongly the concepts of pluralism and relativism. Once again, we find, in
the tension between these two sets of concepts, the more specific manifestation of the larger tension between the
universal and the particular that we have just alluded to. One thing, however, seems clear: the reliance upon reason (and
reason alone) without recourse to something higher and beyond seems doomed to failure, particularly where such
intractable issues are concerned. We would submit that the law of restitution itself is also in need of such a justification.
In this regard, we would consider a very common and important situation that provides an excellent test case and that
was in fact also considered in Blake itself: one where the defendant deliberately breaches the contract with the plaintiff
in order to enter into a more profitable agreement with a third party -- more commonly and popularly known as a
situation of `cynical breach'.
In the situation just mentioned, the defendant does not mind paying the plaintiff damages as it would stand to gain an
even bigger profit from the contract with the third party. The basic argument favouring such an approach and which in
fact endorses the conduct of the defendant is often termed as the doctrine of efficient breach and, so the argument goes,
is one where the plaintiff is also satisfied because it would be paid the requisite damages. The countervailing approach
centred on restitutionary damages would argue for a disgorgement of the profits made by the defendant from his
contract with the third party even though the plaintiff had not suffered any financial loss, which profits would be
awarded to the plaintiff. The House in Blake emphatically endorsed the former approach, holding that no restitutionary
damages should be recoverable in such a situation, even if the defendant had cynically breached the contract. Given the
actual decision in Blake (where, as we have seen, restitutionary damages were in fact awarded to the plaintiff), the
House obviously drew a distinction between the particular fact situation that existed in Blake itself and that of cynical
breach. The immediate question that arises is the basis on which the House drew this distinction. It might assist us at
this juncture if we consider the reasons against the award of restitutionary damages in the situation of an efficient
breach of contract before proceeding to consider why the court would eschew the award of restitutionary damages in a
situation of cynical breach, whilst being prepared to award restitutionary damages in the factual scenario which
occurred in Blake itself. In point of fact, no persuasive reasons were, it appears, given by the House itself. Lord Nicholls
endorsed the conclusion on this point arrived at at the Court of Appeal stage,134 but there is very little else. Turning to
the Court of Appeal decision, Lord Woolf MR, who delivered the judgment of the court, observed thus:135
We do not think that the basis on which damages are awarded should depend on the defendant's moral culpability alone. The fact
that his breach of contract is deliberate and cynical is not by itself a good ground for departing from the normal basis on which
damages are awarded. It is not only that the line cannot easily be drawn in practice; it is rather that the defendant's motives will
normally be irrelevant.
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It is submitted that, consistently with the words italicised in the above quotation, the court did not in fact dismiss out of
hand the impact of a cynical breach of contract. We would suggest that the court's reluctance to accord a more
substantive (or even decisive) role to a cynical breach of contract rests in large part on the perceived subjectivity
involved in the assessment of moral factors, which are necessarily involved in the process of analysis of a cynical
breach. However, as we have already seen, objective standards are an inescapable part of legal life. Further, the
reference in the above quotation to the difficulty of drawing a line in practice is not conclusively persuasive simply
because courts are drawing lines in all manner of cases daily.136 What, then, of the reference in the above quotation to
the irrelevance of the defendant's motives?137 We would suggest that a focus only on the defendant's motives is in fact
unlikely to be helpful. However, we would further suggest that the defendant's motives may be inextricably bound up
with the analysis of the larger issue as to whether or not considerations of fairness and justice require that the plaintiff
be awarded a remedy. Indeed, as we have already seen, the House in Blake did pay close attention to the justice of the
case at hand.138 However, this admittedly brings us back full circle, as it were, to the issue of line-drawing. This raises
the related (and extremely important) question as to why justice could be done on the facts of Blake but not in the
situation of a cynical breach of contract. As we have already asked: what distinguishes the one situation from the other?
After all, is not the question of justice and fairness one that is necessarily premised on some moral conception? If so,
why is the situation in Blake more deserving of a remedy insofar as the plaintiff is concerned? Is it because in a
freemarket system, cynical breaches are expected as a matter of course and that, in any event, to attempt to remedy it
would result in undesirable uncertainty? But, surely, a line has to be drawn somewhere, even in a free market system.
Hence, the courts have formulated various vitiating factors to achieve fairness and justice in appropriate cases. Yet,
even here, the spectres of moral subjectivity as well as uncertainty are never far off. The approach adopted in the CTN
Cash and Carry case (discussed earlier139) is a paradigm example: an example the significance of which is underscored
by the commercial context of the case itself. We would suggest that there is no persuasive reason that precludes the
award of damages for cynical breach of contract. If the reasons proffered to the contrary are accepted instead, the courts
would, it is submitted, have no real control mechanism to achieve fairness via other doctrines (in particular, as we have
seen, vitiating factors) that are also premised upon moral grounds.
We turn now to the reasons supporting the award of restitutionary damages in situations of cynical breach. It should be
noted, in this regard, that Professor Birks has (contrary to the view of the House in Blake, considered above) in fact
argued in favour of awarding resitutionary damages for disgorgement of the defendant's gain. He pertinently points,
amongst other things, to the fact that recovery ought to be allowed with regard to cynical breach of contract140 and that
`[t]he objection [that it is difficult to draw the line141 between innocent and cynical breach of contract] comes perilously
close to suggesting that the courts cannot draw the line between honesty and dishonesty, which, if it were true, would
stultify much of the work they actually do, both criminal and civil'.142 This must surely be correct and is entirely
consistent with the argument tendered above to the effect that there must perforce be objective standards that will guide
the courts. One of the present writers has also sought to argue elsewhere that this objectivity does not necessarily break
down in the process of application143 consistent with the proposition tendered earlier to the effect that courts are well
able to apply these standards in their respective decision-making processes in an objective and impartial fashion.
Professor Birks has also persuasively argued that there are in fact precedents that support the case for the award of
restitutionary damages in such a situation.144 What, then, would be the underlying principle? It has been argued that this
would centre on the principle to the effect that a person should not be allowed to profit from his or her own wrong.145
However, as Lord Goff has cautioned, `[t]he statement that a man shall not be allowed to profit from his own wrong is
in very general terms, and does not of itself provide any sure guidance to the solution of a problem in any particular
case'.146 This caveat is in fact timely since the principle is (as the italicised words suggest) necessarily pitched at a very
general level of abstraction and is therefore of little practical use without application to the concrete facts at hand.
However, it is also true that Lord Goff did then proceed immediately to observe, in the very same case, thus: `That there
are groups of cases in which a man is not allowed to profit from his own wrong, is certainly true'.147 This particular
observation is in fact the result of the concrete application just referred to. It is suggested that the entire process is a
holistic one in which concrete application is undergirded by a universalisable principle. Although Lord Goff himself has
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drawn (in an extrajudicial lecture) a distinction between general principle (which he viewed as being more within the
province of the academic) and practical application to the facts of the case (which he viewed as being more within the
province of the courts),148 it is suggested that this `division of labour' becomes integrated when a final decision is
sought by the courts themselves; in other words, at this particular juncture, fact and value are integrated in the search for
a just result. Indeed, we would suggest that at the level of particular application, the general principle that no person
should profit from his or her own wrong would, more often than not, be manifested in a more narrowly formulated
principle that is appropriate to the case concerned.149 One instance of a more specific formulation may in fact be found
in our discussion in the next Part of this essay.
Given the arguments both for and against the award of restitutionary damages in a situation of cynical breach, is there,
in the final analysis, a definitive answer? What is clear, in our view, is that the theory of efficient breach cannot by any
means be conclusive. This is not to deny its persuasive force but it has to be borne in mind that it is only one conception
of a number of competing conceptions150 of morality.151 Indeed, the theory of efficient breach looks to the
maximisation of social welfare, whereas a rule allowing the award of restitutionary damages seeks to uphold the
institution of contract or (to be more specific) contractual rights.152 It has also been subjected to powerful critique: that
it is itself `inefficient on its own terms'153 since transaction costs (particularly in relation to legal disputes, negotiations
and concomitant lawyers' costs) are almost inevitable.154 In addition to the fact that the theory of efficient breach has
been severely undermined by the various arguments very briefly mentioned, it should also be noted that the
countervailing need to uphold contractual rights is by no means clearly less worthy of protection; as Professor
Friedmann very pertinently points out, `[i]n modern commercial-industrial society, contractual rights constitute a major
form of wealth, and consequently their adequate protection becomes of the utmost importance'.155 It is submitted that
the perception of (in particular) the public insofar as the importance of contract rights is concerned is very real and
cannot therefore be gainsaid. As importantly, the idea of morality embodied in the idea of keeping promises supports
this approach:156 a point emphasised by both Barak and Bach JJ in the Supreme Court of Israel decision of Adras
Building Material Ltd v Harlow & Jones Gmbh.157
Bach J also pointed to the wider societal effect that the upholding of contractual rights may simultaneously promote: in
particular, `[encourage] the performance of agreements and removing the temptation to breach'.158 This also
underscores the points made above, first, to the effect that there is no clear distinction between societal goals and
individual rights and, secondly, to the effect that there is a powerful moral argument that can be prayed in aid of
upholding contractual rights -- an argument that is at least as (if not more) persuasive as that embodied within the theory
of efficient breach.
There is also the argument from uncertainty -- that awarding restitutionary damages for breach of contract would lead to
instability and consequent uncertainty, which are particularly undesirable in the commercial context.159 In this regard,
Barak J's observations in the Adras Building Material case are interesting:160
In my opinion, we should consider a contractual promise as a protected interest. I cannot see the serious risk to the commercial
world which would follow from following my view, but vice versa. If there is anything that affects stability, it is a breach of
contractual obligations.
Professor Beatson has, however, persuasively argued that `giving the plaintiff the defendant's gain is in reality a
monetized form of specific performance'.161 However, the argument in favour of awarding restitutionary damages is not
a carte blanche for the unbridled distribution of judicial largesse. Indeed, even the remedy of specific performance itself
is constrained by various factors. However, the learned writer does suggest some factors that are (consistent with his
argument by reference to specific performance162) akin to those that have to be taken into account by the court in
ascertaining whether it would indeed award specific performance.163 But his caution to guard against `a slippery
slope'164 is well-taken and brings us, once again, to the datum issue as to whether or not there can be objective standards
to guide the court in the case at hand. And this very basic issue applies with even more force to Goodhart's suggestion
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that the theory of efficient breach may be reconciled `to a considerable extent with concepts of fairness by awarding as
restitutionary damages only part of the benefit obtained by the party in breach. This leaves an incentive for an efficient
breach but ensures that the consequent benefit is divided between the parties instead of being enjoyed solely by the
party in breach'.165 While attractive at first blush, this suggestion does not really resolve the more practical question as
to what the underlying rationale for such division is and, without such a rationale, it would be difficult for the courts to
formulate concrete criteria that would guide them in the division of the benefits concerned. The learned writer does in
fact proffer some specific guidelines,166 but there is, with respect, no readily discernible underlying rationale as such. A
little more helpful, perhaps, is his suggestion that `there should at least be a presumption that, where the defendant is not
required to account for its gain in full, it should be required to account for half of it -- though perhaps with a discretion
for the court to vary that figure in special cases':167 although this still does not resolve the initial inquiry as to when the
defendant should not be required to account for his gain in full. Might it be an at least practical solution to allow the
legislature to devolve such discretion upon the courts?168 There has been precedent for this in the sphere of frustration
of contract in the form of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (UK), the provisions of which have become
law in many parts of the Commonwealth. However, we would suggest that it is far more feasible to grant judicial
discretion in the context of frustration as opposed to the present situation of breach of contract simply because (leaving
aside the fact that this is but a broad analogy in the first instance) the doctrine of frustration will be but rarely applied
and, hence, even if less than satisfactory allocations are effected, there is unlikely to be a widespread (detrimental)
impact. We would add that despite the traditional distinction drawn between the legislative and the judicial functions,
the mere fact that discretion is devolved to the courts by the legislature (as opposed to the courts exercising such
discretion on their own initiative) does not, with respect, ensure (in and of itself) that discretion will be exercised
satisfactorily. The key requirement is still the formulation of objective criteria that would guide the courts in order that
they might achieve fair results. Unfortunately, we have come back full circle, so to speak.
To return to the general question at hand (viz, whether or not there is an answer to the tension between the theory of
efficient breach on the one hand and the need to uphold contractual rights on the other), we accept the argument that this
particular approach (centring on the upholding of contract rights) is not conclusively preferable but there is sufficient in
it, we suggest, to negate the argument that its major rival, the theory of efficient breach, is to be clearly preferred. What
seems clear, however, is that the upholding of contractual rights is nevertheless an entrenched feature of the contractual
landscape and although it ought to be balanced against broader societal interests and welfare, it cannot be ignored:
particularly during the present time when the idea of the free market is the dominant ideology across the globe.169
One further argument may be usefully considered: to the effect that restitution for wrongs is intended to protect a
particular facilitative institution, and that insofar as breach of contract is concerned, the pecuniary remedies hitherto
available in a situation of breach (in the form of compensatory damages as opposed to restitutionary damages) already
provide sufficient institutional protection.170 We would suggest, however, once again, that the distinction between
communitarian goals and individual rights is not clear and, indeed, that the reality is that one is inextricably connected
with the other. It is clear, for example, that in the situation that existed in Blake, compensatory damages did not (on one
view at least171 and certainly in the eyes of the court itself) provide an adequate remedy and that, in the circumstances,
it was not merely the plaintiff's contract rights that were unfulfilled but that the broader institution of contract as a
whole had also been simultaneously undermined in the process. More importantly, even if a clear distinction could be
drawn, how does one balance and reconcile the two? This raises, of course, difficult issues of subjectivity that have been
briefly dealt with above. One may further query, for example, why compensatory damages adequately protect the
institution of contract whilst such damages in respect of other areas of civil wrong (such as the law of tort) do not and
therefore require the award of restitutionary damages.172 Problems of line-drawing are inevitable but the actual process
thereof is far from easy.
Public Policy
Given the inconclusiveness as to whether or not restitutionary damages should be awarded in situations of cynical
breach as a general principle, an effort should be made to ascertain whether a narrower principle could be formulated,
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particularly in the context of the fact situation in Blake itself. It is suggested that, viewed on a more specific level, the
actual fact situation in Blake itself can be resolved by construing it as one involving the contravention of public policy
and, hence, allowing restitution for such a wrong would not be a mere exercise in vagueness as well as arbitrary and
subjective discretion.173 Indeed, looked at in this light, the intuitive sense of the House becomes vindicated by the
specificity of coherent justification which (in turn) suggests a possible (albeit rather specific) head for the award of
restitutionary damages in a contractual context.174 If our suggestion is accepted, to disallow disgorgement of profits
would have been tantamount not merely to allowing Blake to profit from his own wrong but (and more importantly and
specifically) to allow him to take the benefit of what were clearly the fruits of a crime175 which was itself premised on a
breach of national security.176 It could of course be argued that no confidential information had in fact been
disclosed177 but it is at least arguable that the element of deterrence is eminently justifiable in a situation such as this.178
It should be noted at this juncture that we are not seeking to argue merely by analogy but are, rather, relying simply and
directly on the rubric of public policy. It should also be noted that had Blake been within the jurisdictional reach of the
criminal courts, he would surely have been convicted of an offence and a `confiscation order' would then have
inevitably followed under Pt VI of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.179 However, absent such a conviction, the relevant
statutory process could not be invoked. It seems to us a blatant technicality that prevented disgorgement from being
effected under the court's civil jurisdiction: a technicality that would lead to patent injustice. We are here aware of the
all too real (but unsavoury) argument that Blake had somehow to be punished.180 We do not endorse in the least the
maxim that `the means justify the ends', for rational and fair procedure is itself the threshold requirement for the
achievement of a fair and just end.181 This is precisely why we are attempting to argue, in the instant Part, how the
desired end is entirely consistent with the legal reasoning embodied, here, within the idea of public policy in general
and the particular need to deter (as well as ensure the appropriate redress for) situations where fruits have been derived
from the commission of a crime that has also been a breach of national security. We would in fact be prepared to
concede that even if the element of a breach of national security were eliminated,182 there would still be an extremely
strong case in favour of disgorgement of the defendant's benefit premised on the deprivation of gains that were (but for
a legal technicality arising, not least, from the defendant's own abscondment) the fruits of a crime.183
We do, however, anticipate possible objections to this suggested approach: not least that which argues that public policy
is a very dangerous animal and that to extend its reach to such a head, particularly where (contrary to the argument
made in the piece) there has been no loss to the plaintiff as such, is a temptation to the opening of the proverbial
floodgates. Despite the ostensibly parsimonious attitude of English courts towards the opening of new heads of public
policy, it has nevertheless been argued (convincingly, in our view) that the heads of public policy cannot be closed.184
Indeed, we would also argue, on a more general level, that whenever the defendant profits in circumstances that are
contrary to public policy (and these would include all the hitherto accepted heads of public policy), the court may award
restitutionary damages to the plaintiff to disgorge the gain made by the defendant, notwithstanding the fact that it (the
plaintiff) has suffered no financial loss. Here, we would add that we acknowledge that in many cases where public
policy has in fact been contravened, the circumstances demand that both parties be denied recovery. However, even the
established law relating to contractual illegality has countenanced a great many exceptions to the general ban on
recovery;185 significantly in the present context, perhaps, is that the vast majority of such exceptions only allow for
restitution. All this having been said, we acknowledge that a situation such as existed in Blake is likely to be a rather
rare one. But the overall persuasiveness of the argument is, we submit, not diminished by virtue of such an
acknowledgment. Indeed, this argument may be buttressed if legislative reforms similar to that which exists in New
Zealand is effected.186
Conclusion
There are, we have argued, at least two possible (albeit quite different) routes towards recovery for plaintiffs in the
context of recovery of gains in the possession of defendants as a result of a breach of contract. The first is to simply
treat what look like restitutionary damages for disgorgement of the defendant's gain as really compensatory damages
instead. As we have seen, the arguments in favour of such an approach are quite persuasive indeed. It might also be
noted, if only in passing, that the possibility of such an approach renders the alternative route briefly mentioned in the
following paragraph rather less radical, particularly with regard to the objection that restitutionary damages ought not to
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be awarded in a contractual context.
The second route is for the courts to actually sanction the award of restitutionary damages for disgorgement of the
defendant's gain. This route is as (if not more) controversial and the argument that the parties have recourse to agreed
restitutionary damages provisions instead187 may mitigate but does not wholly resolve the difficulty, particularly where
the contracting parties did not have the legal acumen (and, hence, foresight) to insert such provisions into their
respective contracts.
While some commentators have been very pessimistic about the future role of Blake (particularly as a precedent),188
Professor Furmston's view that `[u]ndoubtedly we can expect a series of cases over the next few years in which the
boundaries of this exception are tested'189 seems to be a more persuasive view, having regard to the discussion in the
present essay. Indeed, the learned writer's further observation that `[u]ndoubtedly in these cases the forceful dissent of
Lord Hobhouse will also have to be taken carefully into account'190 is also one that we would endorse (again, having
regard to the views expressed in this piece). It is submitted that notwithstanding the relative reticence of the House in
enunciating clear criteria where restitutionary damages for disgorgement of the defendant's gain would be awarded for
breach of contract, there is still some room for arguing that such damages could be awarded, at least in more specific
situations, such as (as argued in the preceding Part) those where public policy has been contravened. Indeed, there is, in
our view, no overriding objection in principle as to why restitutionary damages in the case of cynical breach of contract
should not be awarded, although we have admitted that there are no conclusive arguments that render the countervailing
theory of efficient breach completely unpersuasive. In the circumstances, the judicious award of restitutionary damages
in situations where public policy requires it (such as was, we submit, the case in Blake itself) may be the best (albeit
more modest) way forward. Despite the very commendable attempt (in particular, by Lord Nicholls) in Blake to
enunciate a more general set of constraints as well as guidelines, the enterprise was simply too large to enable more
general propositions to be successfully formulated. Indeed, one might add that this narrower approach is preferable to
(and may in fact incorporate at least the spirit of) the attractive (but rather vague and fledgling) doctrine of good faith.
The quest is an elusive but can never be an illusory one -- if nothing else, because the attainment of justice and fairness
is the constant guiding principle: a beacon that illuminates a way that we can only (at the present time) see as through a
glass darkly. However, a fair and just result is, we submit, inextricably linked to a fair and just process of legal analysis
and reasoning. It is hoped that this essay has succeeded in providing just that little bit more illumination and has
rendered the task at hand just a little less elusive in a particularly vexed area of the law that represents, in many ways, a
jumbled confluence of contract, tort, equity and restitution.
* We would like to express our gratitude to Professor John Carter of the University of Sydney, Professor Peter Birks, Regius Professor of
Civil Law at the University of Oxford, and Dr Hanoch Dagan of the University of Tel-Aviv for their perceptive comments and suggestions.
We should add, however, that they by no means agree with everything stated in this essay. All errors are, of course, ours alone.
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